http://atominfo.ru/en/index.html Tue, 15 May 2012 23:46:03 +0400 Last nuclear news - what the Russians say en-us http://atominfo.ru/images/ai.jpg http://atominfo.ru/en/index.html http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0865.htm Tue, 15 May 2012 23:46:03 +0400 Measurements are neutral Mr Repussard, we know that IRSN is celebrating its 10^th anniversary this year. Could you tell us, and our readers, how you see IRSN today and how you envisage its future over the coming years? In our opinion, IRSN is a unique structure in the nuclear sector, not only in France but also in the rest of the world, which is why your Institute's activities generate such a lot of interest. Doubtless you know that the idea to create IRSN was initially political rather than mainly scientific or technical. Before the creation of IRSN, most of the Institute's knowledge base already existed within the Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute, part of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The French parliament and government took the political decision, ten years ago, to split off the Institute and transform it into a new public entity that is independent of operators and designers of nuclear facilities.
IRSN was founded in accordance with article 5 of French Decree ¹ 2001-398 of the 9th May 2001 and operates in accordance with Decree ¹ 2002-254 of the 22nd February 2002. The Institute is placed under the supervision of the French ministries of the environment, economy, research, defence and health - AtomInfo.Ru note. The initial idea was that, in order to take its decisions within the framework of procedures for authorising nuclear facilities provided for by the law, ASN, the French Nuclear Safety Authority, should be able to rely on the expert opinion of an independent technical body. This happened ten years ago and IRSN therefore became an independent structure. We obtained a status that allows us to plan, fund and conduct research in the safety field. In addition, this situation allows us to work in an independent manner, including with regard to contract work we receive from the nuclear industry. Commissions from industry or instead ASN? Commissions from industry, whether in France or abroad, only represent a small part of our activity compared to commissions from public authorities. Obviously, when we work in this capacity, we are obliged to follow a strict deontology code and a set of ethical standards and guiding principles. For example, for facilities located in France, we do not accept commissions which would lead us to contribute to the establishment of safety assessments for regulatory purposes. However, the fact that we are legally authorised to work on industry commissions, and not only on requests from ASN , allows our specialists to strengthen their skills by working directly with sites (reactors and other facilities), thereby improving their knowledge in their respective fields. But does that not lead to conflicts of interests? In fact, no. The work we do for our clients acts as a complement to the work we do for the French safety authority. What's more, our clients are not uniquely firms and organisations from the French nuclear industry, but also safety authorities from other counties and their TSOs. We collaborate extensively at an international level. R&D provides us with the necessary knowledge, while contract work allows us to put into practice the knowledge acquired. IRSN's founding charter also empowers us with the mission of informing the public of our activities and our results. Which is why, immediately after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, we released information notes on the events on our website. At the same time, all of our activities need to be bounded within a very strict framework. First and foremost we have to give recommendations to the safety authority, which is our key mission. What does all this lead us to? For example, in our research work, we do not allow ourselves to participate in activities developing new 4th generation reactor technologies. In other words, the design of the reactor is not our job. On the other hand, we conduct and will continue to conduct research in the safety field, on all the safety systems of reactor projects that are being developed by other organisations. This will allow us at a later stage to conduct critical analyses of future reactor projects on the basis of the most advanced scientific knowledge. In our contracts, we do not allow ourselves to participate in work involving the drafting of safety assessments. But, before this step, we can carry out studies and research following commissions, from EDF for example, in scientific areas of common interest, with regard to safety or radiation protection. We can also carry out contract measurements on behalf of operators. These measurements are neutral. They are neither an evaluation nor a judgment. When we work for the nuclear industry abroad, we always act in full agreement with the country's safety authority. In our public information actions, we do not reveal commercial secrets and we do not disclose sensitive information, particularly with regard to specific points on which decisions have not yet been taken. Thus, IRSN is developing thanks to its status, which makes it possible to take into account all the aspects alluded to above and to make progress. We operate in accordance with internal regulations that strictly define what actions are possible and what actions would run contrary to our ethics. I personally report to the relevant ministries on the running of the Institute. For example, after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the results of our studies were communicated to these ministries and also to the Prime Minister's office, which contributed to defining the orientations taken by the government during the crisis. The Fukushima crisis Our next question concerns the Fukushima accident. We have to admit that while the accident was actually taking place, particularly over the first few days, we listened attentively to the information coming from France. We even trusted this information more than the information coming from the IAEA. What was IRSN's role during Fukushima? There was a conference on Fukushima in Vienna in March at which I was one of the co- chairpersons. TEPCO presented new details on the sequence of events involved in the accident. At present however, we still do not yet have sufficient knowledge of the sequence of events or the exact times at which successive decisions were taken during the accident. Were these decisions right or wrong, were they taken at the right time or too late, and at what exact instant? None of these points are sufficiently clear at the moment. To date we still have scant precise information on the current condition of the reactors themselves. I'll tell you how IRSN operated, which enabled us to carry out our analysis and our evaluation. Quite frankly, we did not have specific information, we worked on the data transmitted by TEPCO. Transmitted via the IAEA or coming from other sources? Yes, and also the data from TEPCO's website. We were lucky in that several Japanese scientists, who were working in Paris at the time, saw that we were monitoring the accident and were trying to understand what was happening. They spontaneously offered us their help for translations. Our information came from TEPCO, NISA and the American NRC. They sent us the plans of the power plant, which is important. We do not have BWRs (boiling water reactors) in France and so in order to establish our prognosis we needed to have access to a minimum amount of information on this technology. For two or three weeks we worked in real time, exactly as in a national crisis exercise. In France, these exercises are organised on a regular basis, once a month. Even before the Fukushima accident, our engineers were accustomed to working with minimum initial information to establish an in-depth prognosis of the condition of the defence barriers (vessel, primary circuit and confinement). We established a diagnosis and gave a prognosis on the increase in pressure, on what could happen to the temperature and on what could happen over the coming hours. Obviously, we organised conferences between the experts in different fields - for example, experts of reactor systems or calculation codes such as CATHARE (thermohydraulic code for the analysis of accidental situations and the evaluation of safety). Experts always have computational tools, which make it possible to obtain in a short period of time the first rough evaluations of the parameters of interest to us. We also have other groups of experts, particularly for the environment, who take into account meteorological data and can calculate the volume and the direction of the radioactive plume. This data was acquired and as early as the 21^st March we were able to publish a first estimation of the release. If you recall, we stated at the time that the rough estimation of the Fukushima releases would be around 10% of that of Chernobyl. The French were the first to state that the Fukushima accident should be at level 6 of the INES scale. Yes, France did indeed provide this estimation, but not officially. May I remind you that the official indication of the level of seriousness of an accident concerning a nuclear facility can only be given by the government of the country in which the accident has occurred - and by no-one else. The INES scale was specially created to be able to inform the public on what has occurred. If every expert starts giving his or her own estimation and level of seriousness, it could quite obviously create confusion in the population. It goes without saying that IRSN did not indicate what INES scale should be attributed to the Fukushima accident. But the Japanese, who officially announced INES-7, were absolutely right, given the importance of the releases into the environment. At the very moment when France was evoking INES-6, in Russia it was continued to hope to remain at INES-4. We were impressed that you and your colleagues were able to find your way amongst the events that occurred in Fukushima under conditions that were, to say the least, confused. You're right. But you know, when the accident was taking place and while there still had not been any significant release, there was always a hope that the accident would remain at level 4. Do you consider it is necessary to change anything in the information exchange system in the event of a serious accident? We are not accusing our Japanese colleagues, but you have to admit that, over the first few days following the accident, the information provided by TEPCO was not very precise. And the Americans, by giving their recommendation of 50 miles, made a mistake in their estimation of the time it would take for the storage pool of the 4^th unit to run dry. In short, there were errors. Do modifications need to be made to the information exchange system to avoid such errors in the future? It's an important question, to which I'll give several answers. You evoked the recommendation of "50 miles". 50 miles is perhaps too great a distance, but 20 km may not be enough. For a short period - of around two days - there were very great fears regarding the condition of the storage pools. The water level was dropping and everyone was aware that the accident could take on a completely different aspect. You yourself, your colleagues from Atominfo and other nuclear engineers should easily understand what a total loss of water from a storage pool that contains a large quantity of spent fuel would mean! The American approach was perhaps too conservative, but that's understandable. What needs to be changed at the crisis management level? There's no simple answer. The Japanese have been heavily criticised. Very heavily! But let's be completely honest here. If, God forbid, such an accident were to occur in France or in Russia, how much information from expert appraisals would be transmitted abroad in real time? I can't give a straight answer to this question, and I don't think you can either because the main efforts will quite naturally concern national management of the crisis. It's a complex subject. I think greater preparation for accidents is necessary. The internal conclusions that we have arrived at within IRSN are that we need to add to our organisation an "international relations" crisis group, which would be in permanent contact with the IAEA, would exchange information with other crisis centres and would have a role of providing information. It would discuss the various calculation results underway with GRS colleagues or other counterparts. But such a group does not exist for the moment. And if something were to happen tomorrow morning, the problem would quite clearly be apparent. We are going to resolve it, but to do so we need time. We need to train specialists further, we need to equip additional crisis centres and we need to establish robust communications systems with foreign organisations. What do we have as things stand? We are fully equipped to establish a situational diagnosis and prognosis. We can calculate the source term and we can calculate the direction of the discharge plume, taking into account weather forecasts, and estimate the doses likely to be received by the population or the radiological consequences for farming produce. We have a permanent collaborative agreement with Meteo France, which provides us with detailed weather forecasts. We also have mobile measurement equipment, which we can send anywhere in France to measure, on the spot, actual contamination levels. These resources exist and are fully operational. Contamination of air, fine, but do you know how to calculate the dispersion of contamination in the sea? Everyone knows how to calculate (dispersion) in the air, but not (in the) sea - as far as we know. You're right! There's an obvious lack of knowledge in this area. Fortunately, there are few inhabitants of the sea itself! The problem exists for the food industry - the need to calculate the contamination of fish and other elements in the food chain. This could be the subject of an international code development project to provide answers to these questions. At present, we can model the dispersion of radionuclides in water and we have done this for Fukushima. But we do not know how to accurately model the transfer of radionuclides in the marine food chain. It's an interesting subject. Before Fukushima, there was the Flexblue project in France. It's perhaps not the best time to recall this but it is close to the subject. Does IRSN plan to carry out this type of study linked to Flexblue? You know the principles of the Flexblue project, which is a French low power modular reactor. IRSN is participating in this project with respect to its safety concepts. The project is therefore ongoing? Yes, work is continuing and IRSN is working on contracts in the fields of safety and safety requirements for this type of reactor. Obviously, it would be quite complicated to build a reactor of this type in France at the moment. Technical problems can be resolved, whereas problems linked to public acceptance are quite another thing. The project is ongoing, come what may. Codes and experiments We'd like to return to R&D. One of the particular features of your Institute is that it pays a great deal of attention to R&D and a very high level of interest in it. Could we touch on this question and cite some projects. For example, we have heard talk about SARGEN IV. We are carrying out research programmes on the safety of facilities and on radiation protection. Among all the research work carried out within IRSN, serious accident modelling studies, which have been more or less halted in other countries, are the most remarkable and provide results. We have the CABRI programme, which has allowed us to study accidents involving the sudden insertion of reactivity into the fuel, and the PHEBUS research programme in Cadarache, which enables the fusion of the core to be modelled in quite a realistic manner. With fissile material? Yes. In other words, you obtained corium? I would go even further. We went as far as simulating the rupture of the reaction vessel to observe the release of all the fission products in a leak tight casing, which represents the reactor containment vessel. These experiments have shown that the values retained for the release of iodine for example in the previous models were too low. This work has made it possible to correct and validate the relevant codes. We are continuing to study the behaviour of fuel under accidental conditions, for example corium-concrete interactions. Yes, there is a certain lack of experimental data on this subject. We are carrying out experiments at a 1 :1 scale within the framework of a French-American programme. We are also conducting studies on iodine, including organic iodine, and on its interaction with cladding materials. We have a research programme on fires, which are an important risk for nuclear facilities, and studies on criticality accidents. And we are striving, either with our own resources, or more usually in collaboration with our partners, to model all of the risks. What do you mean by criticality experiments? Criticality experiments have been ongoing for decades. For example, let's suppose that AREVA develops new technologies linked to the need to reprocess MOX fuel. It will be necessary to construct new plants, which will have new dimensions, employ different materials and there will be new chemical compounds involved. The safety reports that will be prepared by AREVA to obtain an operating licence will be based, for all of these new features, on existing computations and experiments so as to optimise dimensions, thicknesses, etc. The experimental data, which we obtain independently from industry, gives us the possibility of having our independent source of data and experimental results, which we can then compare with what is proposed by the designer. By carrying out expert appraisals we can thus ensure the soundness of the approaches, solutions and computations prepared by the project designer. Criticality is a known phenomenon, but the behaviour of new materials needs to be modelled, taking into account all new existing data. I could in fact say that, from the safety point of view, it is necessary to choose the most conservative approach and allow for very big margins. However, if we take our own calculations, which we have confidence in, we can, if necessary, be convinced of not having to impose excessive margins. And from an economic point of view, it would be much more efficient. Obviously. Let's return to calculation codes. You mentioned calculation codes for serious accidents. But these codes are also used by designers, including in their safety evaluations. Yes, they are used by designers as results of research activities. A European group known as SARnet exists, in which many European countries are members. Among them are representatives of designers and safety authorities, who can all use this data. We consider that it is necessary to widely disseminate the results of our research work, since they are useful to everyone. Does your Institute use these same calculation codes? Yes, we use these codes. We have in IRSN a simulator known as SOFIA (formerly known as SIPA) which enables the normal or accidental operation of French reactors to be modelled. AREVA has the same simulator. It can work under normal operating conditions, or in situations of deviations from normal operating rules, or in accidental situations. The results of the experiments enable us to enlarge the correct operating limits of these simulators so that they can be used one day to simulate vessel rupture situations. And we would like to go even further. It lets us elaborate accident scenarios, which are then played out during national crisis exercises, and to train our engineers. In our question, we wanted to place the accent on the fact that the constructor and the designer will hand over to you, and to the safety authority, a project which - from their point of view - will be extraordinarily good and which will ideally meet all safety requirements. If your specialists repeat the calculations with the same codes as those used by the developers, is there not a risk of simply confirming, somewhat mechanically, the affirmations of the project designers? We are fully aware of this risk and so we carry out checks with other codes. When, for example, we know that AREVA and EDF use certain codes in their calculations, we can check these calculations with other codes, for example MELCOR. The developers know how to use different codes, but so do we. When the designer uses a set of codes for the preparation of his safety report, we can carry out checks on his work with another set of codes. The lessons of Fukushima We spoke about international working groups. But in France EDF has proposed an interesting initiative, the creation of a Nuclear Rapid Action Force. What does IRSN think of this initiative by operators and are you going to take part in the set up of this Action Force? Since you return to the subject of the lessons of Fukushima, allow me to make a few digressions. We have already discussed crisis management and the exchange of information. We consider that there are still three important points that could be improved. Firstly, it is necessary to take into account all external events and perturbations that can add to the course of events during an accident. For example, in 1999 in the Blayais power plant in France an incident occurred which could have turned out badly. It happened on the evening of the 27 December 1999 as a result of a combination of a heavy storm and a big tide. The level of water in the sea was high and the strong wind generated very high waves. The site was flooded and there was a loss of external power and the stoppage of some safety systems. This event was qualified as level 2 on the INES scale. Analysis of the event has shown that the project did not take into account all the events that could arise. What I'm saying is intended first and foremost to countries that are getting ready to develop nuclear power. They will need to devote a lot of effort to taking into account, in the most exhaustive manner possible, environmental risk factors - earthquakes, floods (in particular when the projected site is located near to a body of water), tsunamis or sand storms. In our opinion, none of these natural events are sufficiently taken into account for the moment in projects. We consider, and it's the result of stress-tests in France, that French nuclear reactors are not well enough protected against a long lasting power cut and a loss of cooling. It is for this reason that IRSN has proposed a new "hard core" concept concerning safety systems, a concept that has been taken up and presented by the safety authority. We assume that the design of additional elements such as diesel generators, pumps and alternative cooling sources need to take into account greater margins than the design margins selected for the remainder of the facility. Will these additional elements be on the site itself or off site? On the site itself. They include electrical supply sources, cooling and particularly resistant buildings, in which the crisis teams will meet when an accident occurs. This latter point is very important. There absolutely needs to be areas and buildings on sites that are protected against radiation. Such a building existed in Fukushima, which meant that specialists were able to work efficiently on the site itself. These additional elements, reinforced buildings, etc., form part of the concept that we call the "hardened safety core". The hard core is the second point that I would like to discuss. The third point is off site crisis management. This concerns the resources of the operator, IRSN, communications and transport facilities. We have considered the situation where, if a serious accident were to occur, road access no longer exists. We now have equipment that can be transported by plane or helicopter, for example air sampling devices that can be attached to planes or helicopters and which allow us to take samples at the actual location of the accident. And what is your opinion of the Nuclear Rapid Action Force? It's a good idea. But its implementation will be the responsibility of the operator, which is going to organise and oversee this force. Are you going to check what will be done in this Force? The proposals that we have heard about indicate that this rapid action force will be in a position to take charge of the whole process of combating an accident as of the second day. I'll tell you what we'd do. In all cases, EDF would have to transmit its emergency plans to the safety authority. When these plans mention a nuclear rapid action force, EDF will need to obtain authorisation for it from the safety authority. In this case ASN will very certainly ask us to carry out an expert appraisal. At the end of this expert appraisal, I will be in a position to tell you what conclusions have been arrived at. I would however like to draw your attention to another discussion that is taking place in Europe. Within the European Union, the following question is being posed: If an incident were to occur on a nuclear power plant, for example in Belgium, would the French be in a position to help the Belgian power plant? In such instances, knowledge of the facility would be vital, including with regard to the most trivial aspects such as "will we be able to plug equipment from France into their electrical switchboards?" The question has also been raised in France as to the usefulness of creating common European reserves in the event of a serious accident in a nuclear power plant? Do you mean reserves of technical resources? It's not a bad idea, but it needs to be discussed first between European operators. And politicians? Yes, obviously. But in Europe relations are always simpler. Stress tests have been the first very successful step in European collaboration. International collaboration IRSN's international collaborations form a quite separate part of our questions. Quite recently, we saw in Obninsk a delegation representing IRSN at the conference dedicated to the 50^th anniversary of the BFS critical model. The presentations made by your specialists generated a great deal of interest among the participants. We saw with our own eyes that the IRSN delegation was in talks with IPPE representatives. We do not know the content of these talks, but the fact that they are taking place is very encouraging. There are not that many countries in the world with extensive experience in the nuclear sector. Which is why this collaboration is important. We have well-established and fruitful collaborations with the United States, Russia, Japan, China and Germany. We also collaborate with other countries on more targeted subjects. The collaboration with the United States covers numerous aspects, including exchanges of codes and information. We used to collaborate extensively with the Soviet Union, then the collaboration with your country tailed off, but it is now coming back into force. I know Professor Bolshov well and we have a strategic cooperation agreement with his institute. We have a partnership with the Kourchatov Institute, although the volume of our exchanges has diminished compared to what existed before. I'm going to visit Russia this year. I plan to meet the management of Rostechnadzor and SEC/NRS. I would add that I regret that the remit of SEC/NRS, our counterpart organisation, does not extend to research work. Obviously, in Russia, Rosatom is in charge of many things and deals with numerous safety aspects. But as I have already said, IRSN does not develop actual facilities. We develop and explore in greater detail knowledge with regard to safety. We see a similar approach to our own in the United States. Unfortunately, in Russia it is not as obvious. Does your Institute collaborate with Ukraine? I know Mrs Mykolaichuk and Mr Gromov very well. We have an active collaboration and we provide them with our help in terms of expertise. We have also worked extensively on the Chernobyl site. We are conducting a radioecology research programme on the Chernobyl polygon. We have a representative in Kiev, who even gives lectures at Kiev University. Do you collaborate with Russia on Chernobyl? Yes, we are conducting a research programme on the effects of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident on the health of children living in the Bryansk Oblast, on areas with low contamination. We are studying the effects of chronic exposure to low doses, because there are still a lot of unknowns in the interaction of ionising radiation with living beings. We agree about low doses. In Russia, some people say that low doses can be good for health. In France as well there are those who hold this view. Perhaps they're right, perhaps they're wrong. You know, low doses are good for us, the collaborators of Atominfo.Ru. We checked. What can I say? Life began and developed in an environment that was more radioactive than that which exists today on our planet. Perhaps living organisms then had natural defences against the perturbations caused by ionising radiation, but we cannot prove it for the moment. As regards Chernobyl, IRSN is conducting studies on non-cancerous pathologies. It's a study that we began with the Obninsk Institute MRRC RAMS, through a pilot project that convinced us of the possibility of obtaining interesting results. We are continuing this study in direct collaboration with the Bryansk clinical diagnosis centre. It's still too early to reveal the results, but they show that the French-Russian collaboration is very fruitful. A personal challenge Mr Repussard, a more personal question. How do you feel in your job as Director General of IRSN? It is said that when you were appointed for this job, many people considered that the task was both daunting and difficult. It was a real challenge for me. Unlike you, I am not an atomic scientist. I've not come from the French Atomic Energy Commission. I'm a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees and I was appointed to this post by President Chirac, who doubtless considered that I had the necessary skills to succeed. Before joining IRSN, I was head of INERIS and I spent many years in Brussels. Consequently, I am not unfamiliar with the general technical culture of European countries and this useful experience was taken into account when I was appointed. Obviously, I had to delve much deeper into subjects that I had studied previously in a more superficial manner. I am very pleased to see that, under my management, IRSN has become an expert body whose expertise and independence are widely recognised. During the French revolution, our ancestors chose a three word motto "Liberty, equality, fraternity". Our institute has its own motto: "Knowledge, independence, proximity". Knowledge is indispensable in our work. Independence is also important, because there are conflicts of interest, economic aspects, and I have to be able to sign reports without any pressure being placed on me. And finally we need to be close to all problems, to be close to all players, including journalists, and to provide information and answers to all the questions you ask us. To illustrate the point about proximity: several months after I joined IRSN a request from Greenpeace arrived addressed to me. I asked the experts to prepare a response. They told me: "Mr Repussard, we're not used to responding to anti-nuclear organisations". To which I replied: "We will not reveal any state or trade secrets, but we will not leave them without any answer". Mr Repussard, thank you very much for this interview given to the e-journal Atominfo.ru. The interview was prepared by Igor Balakin, Andrey Brynov and Alexandre Uvarov (Atominfo.ru). ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0855.htm Thu, 10 May 2012 18:50:41 +0400 AtomInfo.Bg website reported.]]> AtomInfo.Bg website reported. The company's name is "AETs Kozloduy - nowi moshchnosti". It is fully belonged now to the Kozloduy NPP. In the future, up to 49% shares would be transferred to the strategic partner. The executive director of the project company is Atanas Atanasov, former engineer of Kozloduy NPP. ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0836.htm Sun, 15 Apr 2012 12:48:39 +0400 http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/h0576.htm Mon, 21 Nov 2011 23:08:23 +0400 Contract depoliticization "We are satisfied with all the meetings," said Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko after Prague's forum. "We need to understand exactly the terms, conditions and criteria that will be used in competition. The only point we need to know before answering the Czech's call is we have to be sure that all decisions will be not made based on political preferences. The decisions shall be made based on pragmatic criteria of safety, reliability and cost profitability. It is quite enough," said Kiriyenko. Apparently, the Russian side managed to get confirmation from the Czech on depoliticization of the competition. In turn, the Russians have confirmed their readiness "to take a most active part," and, of course, fight for victory. Honestly it was some fears that the Temelin competition will be politically-biased. There are too many partisans of "talks-about-energy-dependence-on-Russia" in the Czech Republic and abroad. They insist that any new VVER-1000 reactors in the Czech nuclear plants will deepen this alleged dependence. The Russians argue. If new Temelin units will receive the Russian-designed reactors, it will benefit the energy independence of the Czech Republic. So, what are the arguments of Moscow? The Russian bid will consider the incredibly high level of localization, up to 70%. Even more, Russia is ready to transfer know-how to the Czech factories. It means they will have an ability to produce basic equipment for all Russian-designed nuclear plants in the future. One could cut the oil-pipe. But one could not take back the knowledge, skills and abilities even if he really wants. Therefore, transfer of know-how coupled with high localization can be considered as a guarantee for the Czech Republic, ensuring its energy independence. Realistic schedule The timetable of Temelin tender seems to be comfortable for all members, all three approved world-leading reactor vendors. No delay is now assumed by industry experts. The complete package of detailed tender documentation defining the full contract scope and technical and commercial requirements for new units has been released on Monday. Three vendors have been given until July 2012 to place their bids. The Czechs will study the bids during one year or more. It is not clear when the winner will be announced but the sources mention December 2013. The next phase will last 44 months. This is for preparation of project documentation, licensing, and other preparatory work. Then the actual construction will start. The first of two new units, most probably Temelin-3, should be put into operation in 2022 or 2023. The second novice must follow him a year later. The timetable looks like the real and soft one. Of course, the customer always has the right to propose certain changes. And the bidders and / or the winner have the right to agree or disagree with the customer's proposals. Czech perspective The Temelin tender is ongoing, and Czech companies are already beginning to feel the advantages of cooperation with Russia. A large group of Czech companies that participated in the Atomexpo Europe exhibition and conference in Prague, reported on the first fruits of common work with the Russians. "Once Atomenergomash acquired a controlling stake in the Arako company in 2007, we doubled our revenue, increased the number of employees up to 220 people and raised wages by 48-50%," said Arako CEO Rovshan Abbasov. The specialty of Arako is valves for nuclear power plants. Today it claims to be one of the largest valve supplier for Russian-designed NPPs. The company is seeking for ASME certificate enabling to fight for orders for U.S.-designed nuclear power plants. "We are also implementing a comprehensive investment program to modernize our factories, and we are spending approximately 250 million rubles. Most of money we took from the local Czech bank under Rosatom loan guarantee. We buy new equipment, modernize the entire production line and looking for significant cost reduction and productivity increase", said Mr.Abbasov. Arako is delivering its valves to Leningrad, Rostov and Kalinin NPPs in the Russian Federation. Certainly the Czech valves are also intended for Mochovce NPP in Slovakia, which is now being completed the third and fourth units with modified VVER-440 reactors. The Modrany power company has been worked with the Russia's Atomstroyexport for Tianwan NPP in China. Commercial director Peter Brozhek hopes the Russians will not forget their Czech partners when the second phase of Tianwan NPP would be under construction. "Well, of course, I would have hoped for the supply for Kudankulam, and Turkey. I hope the people responsible for nuclear business, will feel the political support from the top of government," considers Brozhek. JSC Sigma Group has the over 20-year experience of cooperation with Russian nuclear scientists. "We are working with the Russians for nearly 20 years. We were working with them on Czechoslovakia nuclear projects, and we are working on current projects in Russia. Let me mention Novovoronezh, Leningrad, Beloyarsk, Rostov," reminds marketing director Miroslav Vesely. Mr. Vesely indicates the interest of his company clearly. "Naturally, we assume that if the Czech-Russian consortium will win the Temelin tender, Sigma Group will have its part in the pumping equipment supply." The general attitude of the Czech industry is as following. With help of Rosatom, they can get many profitable orders in Temelin and abroad. "Big projects are seen ahead, in the Czech Republic, in Hungary and Slovakia. I think this is a very important step to attract the Czech suppliers and create favorable conditions for participation," believes "Nukem Technologies GmbH"'s managing director for Russia and Eastern Europe Andreas Vayhard. ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0483.htm Sun, 10 Jul 2011 18:20:18 +0400 End of traveling wave? Professor Toshinsky, currently small power reactors are much spoken about. For example, in the USA a great number of such projects are underway. Most of the designs are light water reactors; but there are some projects, which will be interesting for designers of fast reactors, such as traveling wave reactors, "Hyperion", 4S, and some others. Indeed, these are very interesting innovative projects, which development is at different design stages. They possess the following common feature: their development was preceded by a vigorous advertising campaign in mass media, which produced an impression that the real aims had been almost obtained or would be easily achieved. Now it is too early to draw a conclusion for many of the projects that you named due to lack of the technical information. I'll try to assess them on the basis of the currently known data. Let us start talking on traveling wave reactor, i.e. TWR. The first question: is it true the TWR Project that was so much spoken about in mass media does not exist any more? Not quite so. The authors of the concept, which was difficult to be realized in practice, turned to a clearer concept of a standing wave reactor (TP-1) that in principle allows finding the solution to the tasks stated for TWRs. Let us consider the details of these concepts. First of all, the concept of traveling wave reactors is very interesting. The US scientists agree that USSR scientists S.M. Feinberg and E.P. Kunegin were the ideologists of the concept. In 1958 they proposed a reactor that could operate in a mode of depleted uranium make-up. The reactor should be initially fueled by enriched uranium, then inside the reactor uranium-238 could be reprocessed in plutonium. These are "breed-and-burn" reactors. Yes, the common name of those reactors is "breed-and-burn" reactors. Physics of such reactors is clear. For fast reactors a breeding ratio (a ratio of converting uranium-238 in plutonium) is very high. Of course, the core must be designed in a way that critical concentration of plutonium is equal or less than equilibrium concentration. To move further, please tell us about CANDLE - a burnup strategy proposed by Hiroshi Sekimoto, the basis of TWRs. This is a Japanese variant of "breed-and-burn" reactor that was proposed in Tokyo Institute of Technology by a research group headed by Hiroshi Sekimoto. In this variant there is a cylindrical core with a starting load of enriched uranium or uranium-plutonium fuel. A uranium 238 screen abuts on one end of the core. Plutonium is step-by-step built up in the screen, the core is moving towards the screen and a subcritical area with burned fuel is left behind the core. A Japanese name of that burnup strategy is CANDLE (Constant Axial shape of Neutron flux, nuclide densities and power shape During Life of Energy production). However, a conception of the ignited cigarette is clearer for understanding. Ash (spent fuel) is on one end of the cigarette, further there is a small burning region (chain reaction zone), and then there is tobacco (uranium 238 that will be involved in the process of generating energy). Has anyone validated experimentally an opportunity to construct a traveling wave reactor or reactor based on Sekimoto CANDLE? No, it has not been validated experimentally anywhere and by anyone. In other words, do we have only calculation codes? Yes, we do. However, today codes have been developed well and I think we should trust the codes. The major difficulties are not in physics. Well, but what should we do with drifts per atom? For that reason I also said the major difficulties were not in physics. For "traveling wave" to travel, very deep fuel burnups are necessary. Dense fuel must be used. Oxide fuel is not right for this purpose. At least, nitride fuel could be used, but metal fuel would be better. "Close" lattice of fuel elements is also required. However, currently nitride fuel is on a stage of research but not research and development. Certainly. It was made in pilot production, reactor BR-10 operated with two cores, but uranium fuel was used and burnups were much less then it was required. I said earlier that for "traveling wave" to travel, very deep fuel burnup is necessary. On average, 20 % burnup on heavy atoms is minimum that is required. But 40 % burnup would be better for traveling wave is, as it has been told for TWR. 20 % burnup is not too much. Not so. It is very much. Now mean burnup in fast reactors with uranium oxide fuel is ~6 %, maximal burnup is 11 %. In other words, mean burnup in TWR must be increased three times and it would be better to increase it six times. 20 % burnup was obtained in BOR-60. Even over 20 %, but MOX vibro-fuel was used. However, vibro-fuel is less dense. Don't forget that it is vibro-dense oxide fuel and its density is not sufficient to meet the TWR purposes. Now I'll tell on drifts per atom, which you asked about. In TWR a damaging dose for a fuel element's cladding material is 400-500 drifts per atom (dpa). Let's compare. The design parameters of BN-800 were asserted to be 93 dpa. It is enormous difference. There was an article in AtomInfo.Ru e publishing, devoted to the researches in VNIINM A.A. Bochvar All-Russia Research Institute of Inorganic Materials. They told about the task to obtain 133-164 dpa (not more) by the year 2020. Conclusion. Today and even in the nearest future the required extra-deep burnups and extra-deep drifts don't allow considering the TWR concept as a real one. First, its realization must be verified by multi-year tests, then long irradiation experiments and researches must be performed and so force. About other problems of traveling wave. The core height must be elongated (including a uranium-238 screen). However, the elongated core cannot be constructed because hydraulic resistance is growing sharply as fuel elements must not be in a "loose" lattice. Else, high conversion ratio cannot be provided. In other words, an intrinsic contradiction is peculiar to the conception. Having analyzed all nuances, the TWR initiators proposed a variant of fuel elements re-cladding. What is it? There is a long fuel element, with enriched fuel in a bottom part in the beginning of the lifetime; in the end of the lifetime the top part, where uranium-238 was, will become active. After the reactor has been shut down, fuel is unloaded, expired metal claddings are removed, the upper part of the fuel column, which was a zone of chain reaction, is installed in the bottom of a new cladding, a uranium-238 screen is mounted above. Then re-cladded fuel is loaded in the reactor. So, a mode of depleted uranium makeup is realized in the reactor. But what is there an essential distinction from SNF reprocessing? From the standpoint of radioactivity, this is contamination too. The point is not only in contamination. In the re-cladded zone you must maintain a vector of plutonium enrichment as it was before re-cladding. Otherwise, the reactor won't operate. In other words, the idea is brilliant, but it cannot be realized in practice. What is the final? The experts in "TerraPower" have figured out that a traveling wave reactor cannot be technically realized now. Currently they are developing concept of a standing wave reactor. Therefore, we can say a traveling wave concept has ended. Standing wave vs. traveling wave concerning "breed-and-burn" reactors. A standing wave reactor is a standard reactor with heat-transferring sub-assemblies, which in an event of obtaining the allowed burnup values and damaging dose for claddings can be reloaded, rearranged, fresh sub-assemblies with depleted uranium can be added. You are repeating the words of the content of engineering reports on "breed-and-burn" reactors, which were issued in Russia in the 90s. We know that IPPE and you personally were dealt in that research area. Yes, it's true. It is the concept that we developed 15 years ago. The American name of the concept is TP-1 or "TerraPower-1". It is a sodium cooled standing wave reactor of 500 MWe. But it closely resembles a project of reactor SVBR-600. It's quite true. Many parameters of TP-1 are similar to those of lead-bismuth cooled reactor SVBR-600. Fist that concept was presented in 1994 in Pittsburgh at the Conference on Advanced Reactors Safety (ARS-94). Reactor TP-1 can be technically realized in contrast to TWR. It is a standard reactor, which will be shutdown for partial refuelings. However, the burnup and drifts problems remain but they are less burning. Let's suppose, TP-1 is constructed. What will be the benefits? Well, there will be depleted uranium makeup, but the problem of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will not be solved. What shall we do with spent nuclear fuel of TP-1? How the experts in "TerraPower" are going to solve the problem? This concept allows to increase sharply (ten times or more) use of energy potential of natural uranium as compared with a current level. So, the spent sub-assemblies of TP-1 are supposed to transport to be finally buried in geological formations. Of course, it won't be possible to use built up plutonium. It is difficult to imagine that nuclear (and other) community will agree with the fact that the materials with plutonium content of up to 10 % will be buried in geological formations forever. This will be a plutonium underground depository, and it will attract all potential dealers. Moreover, it will be potential radiation hazard as well. So, I believe that public opinion won't agree with that option. We should not bury the SNF, but we should bury nuclear waste, fission fragments, which have been released in a closed cycle when reprocessing the SNF. All the rest must stay in the cycle. A standard fast reactor operating in a closed nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) can manage it. That's all I wanted to say on an issue of traveling and standing waves. Unreal deadline for a real unit The next is Project "Hyperion" which we have told several times. It is the most scandalous project for the recent years (we don't take into account TWRs and Bill Gates). "Hyperion" as well as TWR is sponsored by private firms. The sponsor of TWR and TP-1 is Bill Gates, the sponsor of "Hyperion" is "Hyperion Power Generation". The question that is not entirely keeping to the subject. In the USA during the last months two private investors interested in nuclear power confronted with financial difficulties. One of these two firms is accused of financial intrigues and its business is under investigation. Is it right that commercial nuclear power development is supported by private companies? We understand when "Westinghouse" is managing the new projects. However, we cannot agree when such projects are managed by beginners without proper skills. I cannot be so categorical. The private investor is financially sponsoring development of the project. There is an opportunity for the scientists, designers, engineers to develop innovative designs. That fact is viable. However, safety must be under the state control. But why "Westinghouse" or "General Electric" does not manage such projects as TWR or "Hyperion"? Why are the unauthorized persons who have money but no skills in nuclear power dealing with such projects? I cannot answer the questions. You should ask these questions to them. However, we should understand that nuclear power is not profitable for the private business. Long investments without prompt repayment. Only large enterprises with strategic goals can manage such projects. As for the small power projects, the additional issues on their economics appear. Well, let us speak about "Hyperion". For the recent two years the concept of "Hyperion" has changed principally. Not long ago it was a futuristic reactor with uranium-hydride fuel, it was supposed to be self-controlled. The reactor released and returned back hydrogen when the temperature changed that affected the spectrum and allowed to maintain the reactor in critical state due to nature laws. Together with hydrogen radioactive gaseous fission fragments were released from the core and did not return back. In view of the Fukushima accident the idea of hydrogen release is shocking. Evidently, they have realized it themselves. As currently lead-bismuth has been much spoken about, they have turned to it. Now the "Hyperion" conception looks real. However, the terms of its implementation, which have been announced by the designers, are unreal. Why? Because there is no fuel for reactor "Hyperion". They are going to use new fuel that is not in production, has not been tested, and is not licensed. How are they going to get a license for operating the reactor with untested fuel? However, they said they were going to use oxide fuel in case of licensing problems. In case oxide fuel is used, characteristics required for reactor "Hyperion" will not be obtained. The reactor is small, operating the reactor using oxide fuel requires heightening the enrichment. At this point, the IAEA requirement concerning 20 % enrichment as maximum, will be violated. In case enrichment is over 20 %, reactor "Hyperion" cannot be exported. However, it can be used within the USA, as the USA is a nuclear country. Yes. But for what purpose? That is, there is no market within the country. I cannot say it so categorically. We know about an incident with reactor 4S developed by "Toshiba" Corporation. This is a 10 MWe reactor proposed to be constructed in Alaska. The number of residents in city Galena (Alaska) is about 600. The electricity is very expensive there as fuel is imported. It was an idea to construct a unit with reactor 4S near Galena. However, despite the residents agreed, construction of the unit has not been licensed up to now. The Galena residents (over 600) were not able to pay the required money for construction of the unit. "Toshiba" Corporation was willing to pay for construction of the reactor. Yes, "Toshiba" Corporation was indeed willing. However, today they are going back on their word. It is reasonable, it's business and "Toshiba" Corporation has calculated all the variants: to give "free of charge" somewhere in order to return back much more. It is evident that the lower the power is, the higher the electricity cost will be and there will be less number of sites where a small-sized power plant will compete with plants using fossil fuel. Therefore, in the USA it is Alaska. For example, it is Alaska. Maybe, there are some other regions in the country. That must be analyzed. However, it is clear there must be an export opportunity for small-sized power reactors. Otherwise, the market will be thin. So, the IAEA requirement concerning 20 % enrichment must be observed. So then, facility "Hyperion" with lead-bismuth coolant is quite realizable. Yes. As compared with our concept of SVBR-10 (developed by FSUE EDB "Gidropress" and FSUE SSC RF-IPPE), its power is larger and it operates using nitride fuel. Reactors SVBR can also use nitride fuel but they can operate using uranium oxide fuel enriched in less than 20 %. Our task is to design the facilities, which can be constructed tomorrow and which have already passed (or nearly passed) the required scope of research and the necessary scope of research and development. In contrast to our projects, "Hyperion" designers have to develop nitride fuel. There are no principal constraints for designers and the problem will be solved. The major question is "when?" with due account that it is necessary to perform tests to verify the resource characteristics. Therefore, it is not clear when reactor "Hyperion" is going to be available for the market. So, I am repeating my words that the "Hyperion" concept is realizable, but the terms of its implementation, which have been announced by the designers, are unreal. Actually, one more question concerning reactor "Hyperion". Lead-bismuth circulation is realized by natural convection. Yes, it is simpler, there are no pumps. However, efficiency of heat removal is several times lower, economical characteristics of the facility are reduced. Professor Toshinsky, we would like to ask you a question that we asked the other interviewees. Aren't you afraid to make a reactor without pumps, in which there are no opportunities for compulsory circulation of coolant? Why should we be afraid? Boiling reactors operate using water natural circulation. Bilibinskaya NPP operates without pumps, there is only feed pump that supplies feeding water from the turbine. And the reactor itself operates using natural circulation. Let us remember our vessel boiling reactor BK-50, western BWRs. By the way, there were pumps at Fukushima reactors, and how did it help? I think there should not be any phobia. The point is that when we use liquid metal coolant, in which difference in densities for hot and cold coolant is not as much as that for boiling water, we cannot obtain high motive head and efficient removal of heat. Therefore, less power can be obtained from the identical volume at the same metal-intensity. So, the less the power is, the higher the specific capital expenditures are, and the lower the competitiveness is. That's all. Natural circulation is very good and necessary for cooling if there is no electric power. That is why reactor "Hyperion" cannot achieve 100MWe in contrast to SVBR. Surely. This is maximum for its dimensions. And in case of constructing a heavy-metal cooled reactor of 100MWe with natural circulation, its metal-intensity and cost will increase many times. As for the pumps. Abroad it may be some fear to use pumps for lead-bismuth circulation. We have gained such experience at nuclear submarines' reactors. Altogether, about 50 pumps were tested in practice. There were two failures without any serious consequences, but by nowadays all errors have been eliminated. Should we consolidate? Again we are speaking about customers of reactor "Hyperion". Advertising campaign for that reactor is more powerful than that for Bill Gates. It is even proposed for the Marianas. The company that is promoting reactor "Hyperion" has signed over 100 Intention Protocols. When do you think reactor "Hyperion" will be available for production in quantities? I think, commercialization of project "Hyperion" is possible to realize not earlier than in 2020, but not in 2013 (as they have announced). And what about consolidation of Russian and American efforts? Our Project SVBR and their Project "Hyperion". Will it be useful? Consolidation of efforts is a political issue concerning relations of two countries. It is clear that Americans want to get the maximum information as lead-bismuth experience has been gained mainly in Russia. And what will we get from them? I don't know. S.V. Kirienko and O.V. Deripaska have signed the documents on conditions of designing and commercialization of SVBR technology. Within the frameworks of a state-private partnership joint venture OJSC "AKME Engineering" is organized. The tasks of the project have been stated, works on the project have been launched, regular financing for the project is assigned. The issue concerning the new participants of the project should be considered by stockholders of OJSC "AKME Engineering". Anyway, I think the nuclear part must be performed in Russia. Though, it must not be ruled out that certain components should be purchased abroad in case they are cheaper and their quality is better. However, integration must be realized in Russia. Therefore, there is a counter-question: what for do we need consolidation of efforts? Well, as for project "Hyperion", it is clear that there are ways for collaboration with the USA (business-agreement or purchase of components). And is any collaboration possible on "TerraPower" projects? I think in case Bill Gates is going to invest money into that technology, Russia must be a collaborator but without any responsibility for realization and final results of the project. I don't eliminate the fact that in the course of development of TWR (TP-1), the viable theoretical and practical results will be obtained, first of all, those on deep fuel burnup and large damaging doses. These results will be also useful for designers of traditional standard fast reactors. Bill Gates along with his team is focusing efforts on fuel burnup and damaging doses. And we are interested in material's temperatures. However, won't collaboration with "TerraPower" result in dissipation of domestic specialists' efforts? In case there were hundreds of high qualified domestic specialists, few of them could collaborate with American experts. But it is impossible. Yes, such risk is real. Though, the correct distribution of efforts is possible. And here is an interesting variant: to develop as an international project our new research reactor MBIR that is supposed to be constructed in Dimitrovgrad. In case we succeed in persuading Bill Gates to take part in Project MBIR, it will be a great benefit for the world nuclear power. We are looking forward to construction of MBIR. However, we can see that the opportunities, which are supposed to be realized in MBIR, slightly differ from those in BOR-60. Is it real to persuade the foreign partners to collaborate in that project? Maybe, fast neutron flux density in the first cores of MBIR will slightly differ from those in BOR-60. However, in our country there is wide experience of upgrading research fast reactors. For example, BR-5 was upgraded to BR-10. I believe the opportunities of MBIR will be extended in the course of operation. Utopian class reactor We have just remembered reactor 4S. What is your opinion on this facility? This is a modular reactor, which is peculiar all advantages of that type reactor. What is a weak side of 4S? That reactor facility is irrepairable. It is an integral type reactor with electromagnetic pumps, intermediate sodium-sodium heat-exchangers, cooling heat-exchangers. However, absolute reliability of the equipment is expected. It is supposed that a module with reactor 4S will operate long without replacement and repair of the equipment installed within the reactor monoblock. This is only possible in case of absolute reliability of the reactor equipment. Is there any access to the equipment? No, there isn't. It will be very difficult, practically impossible, to access the equipment in the process of reactor operation. In addition, reactor 4S should be installed underground. I would say it should be installed half-underground. The company reported that the service lifetime will be 30 years without refueling. From the standpoint of physics it is quite achievable. That is, Japanese scientists rely on quality of reactor 4S. Yes. And I think they are mistaken. Now we won't touch upon the Fukushima accident. However, not long ago their trusting in quality let them down at reactor "Monju". I believe that technical culture in Japan is very high, but experience is required as well. We laid open to public the data on failures in their centrifuges, and we have questions to their technological culture. I see. However, I am speaking about specific reactors with sodium coolant. In 1995 December a fire happened at reactor "Monju". As a result, the program on fast reactors in Japan was stopped for 15 years. Last year the reactor was launched, but it was shutdown almost after launching because a steel column of the refueling equipment unit dropped into the reactor vessel. And up to now they don't know how to remove it. That's true. Now about research sodium fast reactor JOYO. It is shutdown as there was an accident too. That is, Japanese scientists faced with technical difficulties. It should be highlighted that in all countries the process of mastering the sodium technology was hard. In my opinion the operation of BN-600 is a major breakthrough in Russia. And this is an outstanding achievement of Russian scientists, designers, engineers, operational personnel. Of course, there were leaks, problems with steam-generators. However, the technology is operating, currently BN-800 is under construction and development of BN-1200 is underway. Here, people experience is viable. That experience cannot be described in books. Experience, which is succeeded by generations, designers, operational personnel. In Japan there is no such experience. How old is Project 4S? I first heard of Project 4S in 1995. I liked the conception very much as it was a modular one. However, in addition to irrepairability, there is an untraditional new scheme of reactivity control. The reflector moves slowly, the core is long, chain reaction only occurs in a short part with the reflector. That is, some kind of a candle. Yes, there are some common features. I think I am not mistaken to say the reflector is moving with a speed of approximately 1 mm per week. And what will happen in an event of system failure? I have told already in that system nothing can be replaced on the spot. Mentality of Japanese designers is quite different as they believe that there must be no failures at all. Russian designers don't think so, and I am inclined to trust our domestic specialists. Our designers insert in the project all possible failures and think what should be done in an event of each failure. The approach of Japanese designers is quite different: their goal is that the design must have no failures at all. Of course, the aim is wonderful, but not real. So, it is an utopian class reactor. Africa didn't build by itself The Project of Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) was closed last year. It was a small power high-temperature reactor designed under a slogan "Africa builds by itself". Wouldn't you like to draw a conclusion on this program? It was a very interesting project. The advertising campaign for this project was powerful. They spoke about hundreds of customers all over the world. The full cost of the project was estimated to be ~ ˆ 1 billion. The conception of gas reactors possesses a general shortcoming: it is very difficult to overcome the consequences of the accident of tightness failure in the primary circuit. Under normal pressure gas can remove heat very poorly. It is true even for helium. Therefore, we need high pressures, about 100 at. In an event of tightness failure, helium will be released from the primary circuit, it will be replaced by air, and there will be no natural circulation. But residual heat must be removed. For that reason, special fuel is made for such reactors, i.e. microfuel with multi-layer coating in a graphite matrix. Tests have revealed that before accidental temperatures have been obtained, gaseous and volatile fission fragments won't be released from microfuel. However, we have to examine what will happen with a heap of spherical fuel pebbles in an event of loss of circulation. Won't it burn? Nevertheless, graphite is a fuel component, and in an event of tightness failure air will penetrate into the circuit. To make that fuel heat-resistant, different solutions are used, multi-layer silicon carbide, pyro-graphite and other materials are applied. The solution to a heat-resistant problem is found. At the same time, the task of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing is becoming much more complicated, it requires own infrastructure for the fuel cycle and corresponding expenditures for its development and functioning. The alternative is PBMR operation in the open cycle without reprocessing. I doubt whether it could be accepted. Moreover, in PBMR the spherical fuel pebbles, which diameter equals to that of a tennis ball, must cycle through the core ~ 6 times. Circulation of spherical fuel pebbles is realized with the help of screw conveyers. On unloading, fuel pebbles must be moved to the burn-up assaying equipment. After burn-up has been determined, fuel pebbles must be routed either to the spent fuel tanks or back to the core, depending on the burn-up. However, technological realization of the process is difficult. Regarding to this, a concept of Russian-American Project GT-MHR is much more realizable. In that project the fuel shaped as graphite hexagon units is replaced in the process of partial refuelings. It is interesting to highlight the following. Project PBMR was promoted by state company ESKOM but it didn't result in success. I can suppose this project is a result of lobbying. When financers give credence to incompetent people, the result will be always negative. Government's gift Currently Belgium System MYRRHA (Multipurpose Hybrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications) is much spoken about. MYRRHA is a sub-critical lead-bismuth cooled reactor operating in tandem with a proton accelerator. What do you think about it? I would like to say that as for the announced terms, this project is the most realizable. Maybe, first launch of the system will be this year. MYRRHA is developed by Europeans to solve the problem of minor actinides transmutation. Of course, we esteem the highlighted problem, but in our opinion it is not a major problem of nuclear power. Well, it is a vital problem for densely populated countries and areas such as Europe, South Korea and so on. The people in those regions are troubled by long storage of SNF with high radiation potential. And they wish to reduce this potential by transmutation of the series of nuclides including minor actinides. But why cannot we transmute actinides in a conventional normal BN reactor? This requires to develop BN reactors and not all countries agree with that. But it is not only reactor BN, as each fast reactor is able to transmute minor actinides into fission fragments. How did the concept of accelerator-driven transmutation systems originate? It happened right after the Chernobyl disaster, when there was fear of prompt reactor runaway. In case of a sub-critical system, prompt reactor runaway cannot occur. For that reason, the idea of hybrid systems was supported by the certain governments. There is a "social" aspect, more correctly, political one. Many countries don't want to finance development of the reactors, as they consider the private companies must be dealt with it. At the same time, they finance transmutation systems especially if it is not only a reactor, but it is a system with improved safety, which will assure in future the solution to the problem of long-lived radioactive waste. What is MYRRHA? It is a sub-critical reactor. From above the accelerator a proton beam is delivered. The whole refueling system must be on the bottom as well as the control system. Technical realization of that is very difficult. They have implemented a system of "under-melting" optical video camera, ultrasonic visualization. That is, they watch everything that happens in the facility in a megahertz ultrasonic range. This is a great technical achievement. However, the main question is how it will operate. The additional difficulty is that a proton beam is pulsing, it will cause pulse load for heat release, and fuel does not require cyclic loads. We have two facilities instead of one. Therefore, we have two sets of problems. That's true. The cost is doubled, and reliability is reduced. Hamid Ait Abderrahim, Principal Manager of Project MYRRHA, whom I have met with, understands the situation clearly. Finally, in case of severe difficulties, it will be possible to "cut off" the accelerator and there will be a lead-bismuth cooled research reactor with fast neutron spectrum. In principle, nobody is objecting. If the government is financing perspective scientific and research work of our colleagues and has established a purpose, we are welcoming it. However, is it real to speak about commercialization of MYRRHA? No, it is not. In no circumstances. MYRRHA is not a commercial project at all. It is an experimental nuclear facility that has been built with the help of government (European) financing. Russian specialists are working there too. It is planned to build a large international centre for data exchange, obtaining the new information and so forth. Ideal cannot be achieved Professor Toshinsky, we talked about several reactor projects. The following should be highlighted: in each project different coolant is used, i.e. as for coolant, the opinions are different. It will never be the same opinion for the coolant. There is no ideal coolant in nature. Each coolant that was used or proposed for usage possesses its own advantages and drawbacks. Option for coolant is a task that depends not only on coolant's parameters, but on coolant's mastering and reactor purposes. Of course, sodium is the best heat-transferring medium. However, when speaking about nuclear reactor coolant, we should take into account the other coolant properties, which burden the reactor facility. It is coolant's chemical activity of interaction with air and water. It is worth to say (I have touched upon BN-600 already) that Russian engineers and designers have overcome all these difficulties, reactor is operating normally, but it has resulted in a higher cost of the system. What can justify the higher cost? For example, it is the fact that sodium allows to provide high power density of the core, and in case breeding ratio is high enough, short doubling time of plutonium can be obtained. And if that requirement is vital, there is no alternative to sodium at all. But now that requirement is not stated in Russia. In Russia that requirement is not stated, but in China and India that requirement must be met. In different countries the approach is different. And if Russia does not want to lose leadership, we must think how to meet that requirement. However, as we accept the fact that we should only breed and replace the spent fuel (the amount of bred fuel equals to that of spent fuel), i.e. BR=1, we should consider other coolants, for example heavy coolants, which make possible the operation in a mode of fuel self-providing. In heavy coolants excess plutonium is not built up, and they are not overburdened with the problems concerning insertion of the intermediate circuit. That's right, so currently in force Federal Target Programme "New Generation Nuclear Power Technologies …" provides lead cooled BREST and lead-bismuth cooled SVBR along with BN 1200. So, we should agree that each coolant possesses its own advantages and drawbacks. We know about water from heat power engineering. Water is cheap, comfortable… …but it is corrosion-hazardous. For any coolant (helium is an exception) there are limits on a temperature range and limits on addition agents. The statement that sodium cannot corrode is not right. It will be right on the assumption that oxygen concentration in sodium is minimal. Increase of oxygen will cause corrosion. For lead and lead-bismuth we should also normalize the oxygen. For water almost ten quality parameters (pH is the first) should be met. Only helium is chemically inert. Shortcomings of helium are as follows: high pressure, large expenditure of energy for circulation. Therefore, in helium cooled reactors the expenditures for own needs are higher than those in water cooled or liquid-metal cooled reactors. However, the higher efficiency can be obtained. Yes, I agree. I am highlighting again that each coolant possesses the own advantages and shortcomings. You should choose reasoning from the reactor purpose and extent of coolant's mastering. The task is difficult, with multiple factors, in which one should take into account not only heat-transferring properties, but all the others as well. And are there efforts to design ideal coolant? It is said that in IPPE there were attempts to design sodium-lead coolant that coupled the advantages of both coolants but without their shortcomings. Yes, the reports on such works were considered. However, unfortunately such coolant has not been designed yet. But the attempts are made. If lead is added in sodium, we'll eliminate inflammability and explosion hazard of sodium but other problems will appear. Operating such coolant will be very difficult. Not all coolants passed testing by time. The organic coolant was used. Low pressure was an advantage. However, the problems of radiation and thermal resistance resulted in difficulties in operating the "ARBUS" facility (deposits, gums, hydrogen, others). Minsk Project on dissociating gas was developed … … Obninsk Project on mercury was developed. Nobody has ever considered mercury as widely used coolant. It was only used in first small experimental fast reactors, which didn't require heating. Mercury is expensive and toxic. But it was not activated. Everything happened there. Mercury captured neutrons, proper neutron balance could never be obtained there. Large and small SVBR Surely, when speaking with Principal Manager of Project SVBR we would like to touch upon SVBR-100. I have already told development of the Project is underway. 50 % of financing is provided by the independent power company controlled by O.V. Deripaska. Financing is realized via state-private joint venture OJSC "AKME Engineering". Launching is scheduled in 2017. The task of the designers (Chief Designer of the Project is Limited Liability Company "EDB Gidropress" and Scientific Supervisor of the Project is SSC RF-IPPE) is to perform by the fixed date the necessary R&D for reliable realization of the Project. As the scheduled terms have been assigned and financing is limited, the Project is being developed on the basis of the conservative approach. The potential that allows in future heightening the safety level and improving the economic parameters is not realized in the Project. These purposes have to be realized in the next generation of lead-bismuth cooled reactors. SVBR-100 is a first civilian reactor with lead-bismuth coolant. It is not right to think that SVBR 100 must solve all the problems. The design of the reactor must be maximally simple, reliable and it should be supported by tested technical solutions. However, this will postpone for a long time the quantity construction of reactors SVBR. I don't think so. First, the realized experimental-industrial power-unit will possess competitive technical and economical parameters within the facilities with identical capacities. Then, when we are speaking about an advanced lead-bismuth reactor, it does not mean that we bear in mind a new project. The design of the advanced reactor will be almost the same, not much renew will be required. The same pumps will be used, but the equipment will be different. It is difficult, especially after the Fukushima accident happened, to forecast the power situation in the world in 2017. Is it reasonable to forget about other SVBR variants, such as SVBR-10? The demands for energy will always exist. When speaking about SVBR-100, 100 MWe is a proper option for power. In that reactor operating on mixed oxide fuel, core breeding ratio equals to 1. It means that in the closed cycle the reactor will operate in a mode of fuel self-providing without consumption of natural uranium. The fuel cycle will be that used in large nuclear power for BN reactors. We have been told that 100 MWe corresponds to a city, which population is 100 000, i.e. Obninsk. Yes, that's true. It is approximately 1 kW for the person. On the other hand, why shouldn't it be more? Why cannot it be 200 MWe? After all, the economic parameters will be better. The reason is that such module cannot be transported by railway. And dimensions of our module allow its railway transportation. Thus, the number of potential sites increases. The specialists in "EDB Gidropress" say that we should give up the requirement to railway transportation for the unit. Yes, but it is for reactors WWER. Their priorities are the economic parameters and high capacities. Our foreign competitors allow 1600 MWe for light water reactors and don't presume their transportation by railway. They have highways and water routes. Yes, that's right. In Russia freight is mainly transported by railway, and many our roads do not fit for transportation of such heavy freight. The West can give up the railway transportation. However, in Russia giving up the railway transportation will reduce at once the number of potential sites. Now about SVBR-10. Yes, that project can be realized in short terms, it requires less scope of R&D than those for SVBR-100. However, the economical parameters of SVBR-10 will be worse than those of SVBR-100. If power reduces 10 times, the specific cost of the plant will increase 2,5-3 times. On the other hand, it is possible to connect to SVBR-10 medical beams and so forth. Yes. That's right. However, these are additional applications, which will affect the commercialization slightly. There is no medical beam in Moscow and in the region. So, construction of SVBR-10 in Obninsk with a beam for medical purposes will be a rescue for many people. I think it will be better to construct a special facility for that purpose. And it shouldn't be a reactor, but a system on the basis of the accelerator, which does not depend on criticality and nuclear safety. In case such designs are realized, the treatment facility will be almost in each hospital. Will it be better to test the new types of fuel for SVBR in a small power reactor, i.e. in a lead-bismuth research reactor? Why isn't it possible to use SVBR-100 in commercial purposes and to use SVBR-10 in scientific and research works and R&D? There is no need in a special reactor for research, as the cost of the research reactor is not much lower than the cost of the experimental-industrial unit with SVBR-100. There are other ways for testing the fuel. Tests should start in BOR-60, assemblies (not a single one) should be irradiated there. Then the tests should be performed in reactor BN-600. From the standpoint of radiation resistance of the material and fuel, it doesn't matter what coolant is inside the cladding, sodium or lead-bismuth. Everything will be identical inside. The fast neutrons are viable. And that is the shortest way of realization of the point. We will have one research reactor (MBIR), in which among the others there will be loops with lead and lead-bismuth coolants. I think it will be too much expensive to build the second research reactor. This question is concerning the intellectual property. The impression is that now small west companies use an interest in small power to make attempts to leave this field for themselves. They want to take out a large number of patents and then use the patent funds for life. Won't it limit nuclear power development in Russia? Won't our competitors take out patents on our ideas? I would like to say that we watch the situation very closely. The authorized capital of OJSC "AKME Engineering" contains the point on intellectual property, i.e. the point concerning the results earlier obtained at "Rosatom" enterprises including SSC RF-IPPE. These all will be drawn up as intellectual property with corresponding rights. The purpose is to eliminate obstacles and to impede somebody else to use the results. Indeed, this is a very serious issue. The suspicion is that behind many West advertising campaigns there is some kind of gamble. To gamble - to take out patents, to attract the investors under the patents, and then whatever will be. Now to take out a patent, one only needs money. Practicality does not need to be validated. It is important that there is some new idea. In some time it may become clear that expenditures were useless. Our position is well-defined. In case we are taking out a patent, we must be confident that it will be useful, and there will be taken out patents for all innovations, which will be implemented in the SVBR Project. And can be there a situation when for a certain technology that is already in use but not patented, a patent is taken out in the West? No, it cannot. The patent analysis has been realized by OJSC "AKME Engineering". A group of patent engineers was working. They don't find such situations though there were certain attempts to impede our work. For that reason, we are not going to discover the technical information concerning SVBR details prior to the required time. That will be done when necessary. The time when we were ready to disclose the significant information to the West passed. Now we have Federal Target Programme, all significant innovative technologies are being financed. That is why we are not nervous when we watch booming organized by our West competitors. It is clear for us that in most cases there is no content behind the advertisements. And we know we won't be late. Professor Toshinsky, thank you for the interesting interview for AtomInfo.Ru e publishing. Interview was prepared by Igor BALAKIN and Alexander UVAROV (AtomInfo.Ru). ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0436.htm Sat, 28 May 2011 15:49:08 +0400 Sergey Kondratyev, Head of the Real Sector Group, Department of Economics, Institute for Energy and Finance (Russia):]]> Sergey Kondratyev, Head of the Real Sector Group, Department of Economics, Institute for Energy and Finance (Russia): After the Ignalina NPP was put out of operation, the situation in the Baltic energy system has complicated substantially. For instance, Lithuania that had been a major energy exporter during the whole post-Soviet period (in 2009, its exports of energy exceeded imports by 2.9 bln kilowatt-hours) has now turned into an importer (nowadays, about 56% of the demand is met by imported power, which is one of the highest figures in the world). As a result, prices volatility increased significantly in the domestic market, which affected rather negatively dynamics of energy consumption: in 2010, Lithuania was the only of the Baltic states (and countries of the Baltic basin) that reduced energy consumption by 4.9% instead of increasing it. Undoubtedly, in this situation, Lithuanian business (not only in construction) is interested in construction of the Baltic NPP, as it will not only increase reliability of power supply in the region, but ensure more predictability in price dynamics in the energy market. Contrary to the business, Lithuanian politicians have been against the construction from the start. However, within last three years, Lithuania's intentions to build a nuclear plant in its own territory failed to turn into a project implementation stage. In the situation of toughening environmental standards (while most capacity in heating generation was put into operation in the Soviet times and has not undergone any serious modernization yet) and the need to put old thermal plants out of operation, the Baltic energy system can face significant energy deficit as early as in 2017-2018. Probably, politicians fail to understand it now, but business does. In these circumstances, it is the Baltic NPP that can prevent the situation in the Baltic energy system taking the negative way (i.e., covering the deficit by increasing energy generation at thermal plants with high costs, boosting imports from North European countries and, as a result, significant growth in prices). Participation of the Lithuanian business in construction of the Baltic NPP must be seen as a new opportunity to earn money for Lithuanian companies which under the current slow-down in the construction and the economic recession found themselves in a situation that leaves much to be desired. And such developments should be welcomed, first of all, by the Lithuanian government and parliament, because it is them who will collect more taxes and have more workplaces in case Lithuanian companies take part in the project. ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0283.htm Tue, 8 Mar 2011 15:45:34 +0400 Alexander Sokratovich, we speak you several times about the romantic period of Russian nuclear regulatory body. Of course, today we would like to return to this subject. You know, the romantic period is finishing, and its end is happening nowadays. The new thing are coming, and it does not always acceptable to us - those who started the Russian Atomnadzor. What I think are important? I believe that in no case be losing those traditions that are ripe in our service. Unfortunately, I see a nasty tendency to forget tradition. Relationships between the Atomnadzor and supervised enterprises were always been a certain symbiosis, which was useful as supervisors and supervised. We agree. So it was just because the personnel in the supervision came from the enterprises. And it is! The experts were from enterprises and skilled enough. They knew all the aspects of their work, knew all the details and could not only control the work, but also help to implement it. A few words on the skill. Today, the army of managers is earnestly believing that one can take the man responsible for the licensing of alcoholic beverages, and put it on licensing, and even to supervise the nuclear reactor. But it did not work. In order to competently oversee and understand what you are talking with supervised, you must be highly qualified. Perhaps, at the level of PhD. Let me explain to you the example. Suppose I tell you that in this particular reactor, the effective beta equals to 0.7, and this is a situation that improve nuclear safety. In order to understand what I actually said, you should have some education. As a minimum, to know what is beta and what is being measured. Not exactly. You can learn what an effective beta, or physical beta, from a directory. You need to feel the object, to understand the arising paradoxes, which for the everyday consciousness amazing. The topic of my dissertation was to study the probability of accidents associated with the introduction of positive reactivity. I was considering such a system in which the accident happening, but not every time. In other words, we dropped the fuel rods in the assembly, for example, 100 times and 70 times to be an accident, and 30 times will not. And those numbers can be controlled within certain limits. If we put a neutron source in a potentially crashed system, it would seem, we are decreasing its security - we did add there neutrons. In fact, nuclear safety will be improved at the expense of some deterioration in radiation safety. Having constant neutron source, the assembly much earlier "understands" that it is supercritical, and the likelihood of a serious accident will decrease because the operators and logic circuits will have more time for action. When you talk about these things with the managers, they simply do not understand you. And they do even have an idea why you need such knowledge. Returning to our topic, I might add - it is impossible to compare the fire safety with nuclear. I respect the fire safety, but the consequences of violations of nuclear safety will be a lot harder than for breach of fire regulations. Maybe the nuclear branch shall be again a separate oversight body, as it was previously thought and done by Mr. Wisniewski in the USSR. ]]> http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0263.htm Mon, 21 Feb 2011 08:46:06 +0400 The United States will continue to expand its civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia, including reactor development and security of radioactive materials, a top U.S. nuclear official told RIA Novosti. http://atominfo.ru/en/news2/b0262.htm Mon, 21 Feb 2011 08:44:45 +0400 Russian and U.S. generals will meet in Lisbon in June to discuss cooperation between the two countries in fighting nuclear terrorism, the head of the Russian Military Commanders Club said on Wednesday.